The need for scalable key management support for Mobile IP -especially, the route-optimized Mobile IP -is well known. In this paper, we present the design and the first implementation of a public hey management system that can be used with IETF Mobile IP. The system, called the Mobile IP Security (MoIPS) system, was built upon a DNS based X.509 Public Key Infastructure with innovation in certificate and CRL dispatch as well as light-weight hey generation. The system can be used to supply hey parameters for authenticating Mobile IPv.4 location management messages and to establish IPSec tunnels for Mobile IP redirected packets. It can also be used to augment emerging firewall traversal techniques for Mobile IP. A FreeBSD UNIX prototype with core@ctionality was completed at the time this paper was published 1. ~NTR~DU~~-I~N 
~NTR~DU~~-I~N

Review of Mobile IP Protocols
Mobile IP or IP mobility support [rfc2002] (abbr. MIP) is a protocol for passing IP datagrams between a Mobile Node (MN) and its Corresponding Nodes (CNs) as the Mobile Node changes it attachment point on the Internet. The protocol employs network layer agents to capture IP datagrams that are sent to the Mobile Node's permanent IP address in its home subnet and redirect these datagrams using IP-IP encapsulation [tfc2003] to a Care-of IP Address (WA) assigned temporarily to the Mobile Node while it is visiting aforeign subnet. The agents in the home subnet are. known as the Home Agent (HAS) and the ones in the foreign subnet are known as the Foreign Agents (FAs). Together, these mobility agents track the movement of Mobile Nodes by passing registration messages among themselves and the Mobile Nodes. Based on the registration process, the Home Agents keep track of the locations of Mobile Nodes under their administration, and serve as the entry points to the IP-IP packet redirection tunnels. The Foreign Agents, however, may or may not be the exit points of these tunnels depending on the choice of Care-of Addresses: if the Care-of Address is the IP address of a network interface on a Foreign Agent then the Foreign Agent is a tunnel end-point and the Care-of Address is called Foreign Agent-Care-of Address; however, if the Care-of Address is a address assigned temporarily to a Mobile Node by DHCP or PPP then the Care-of Address is called co-located Care-of Address and the Foreign Agent serves only as a last-hop router and a Mobile IP administrator. In order to pass IP datagrams from the Mobile Nodes through the firewalls that surround a foreign subnet, reverse tunnels may be established from Care-of Address to the Home Agent [mip-tunnel-reverse] using IP-IP encapsulation. These tunnels are also managed by the Foreign Agents and the Home Agents via the registration process.
A more sophisticated version of Mobile IP, called route-optimized Mobile ZP [mipoptim] , was also proposed to the IETP Mobile IP working group. In that protocol, the Care-of-Address of a Mobile Node can also be disclosed to the Corresponding Nodes and a certain number of Foreign Agents, which have served the Mobile Node, using the location binding update messages. As a result, the Corresponding Nodes may tunnel their IP datagrams directly to the Mobile Node's Care-of Address, and the previous Foreign Agents may also forward IP datagrams destined to the Mobile Node to the current Care-of Address of the Mobile Node. These additional tunnels can help to shorten the transit time of redirected packets and reduce the number of packets dropped due to delivery failure. Consequently, they will improve the performance of Mobile IP, especially when it is used with a connection-oriented protocol such as TCP. 
Mobile IP Security Requirements
While Mobile IP promises un-interrupted IP co~ectivity when the Mobile Nodes roam around in the Internet, it also increases the risk of causing remote redirection of intemet traffic [bellovin-891 by simply introducing bogus registration and binding update messages. In addition, the presence of Mobile Nodes in their visiting networks may cause security concerns to both their home and foreign networks. Hence, the two goals of Mobile IP security protection are (1) to allow a Mobile Node to enjoy similar intemet co~ectivity and safety when it visits a foreign network as it is in its home network and (2) to protect both the home and the foreign networks from passive and active attacks while the Mobile Node roams in the Internet.
Throughout the development of Mobile IP, the following security services have been considered useful for protecting a mobile intemet: l data integrity, data origin authentication and anti-replay protection of Mobile IP registration and location update messages, .
access control of the Mobile Nodes when they use resources on the visiting networks, . data integrity, data origin authentication and data confidentiality protection of IP packet redirecting tunnels, . location privacy of the Mobile Nodes and . anonymity of the Mobile Nodes.
Among these services, the$rst three are essential to the secure operation of Mobile IP. The Mobile IP Security (MoZPS) architecture was developed to provide these services.
Organization of the Paper
In the remaining six sections of this paper, we will discuss the design and implementation of MoIPS system. Section 2 offers a system overview which explains our approach to provide the three The implementation of first MoIPS prototype will be briefly described in Section 6 before the conclusions are given in Section 7.
MoIPS SEXEM OVERVIEW
Security Services
As mentioned, the MOE'S system was developed to support three security services that are essential to the safe operation of Mobile IP. These services are (1) authentication of Mobile lP control messages for location update, (2) access control of Mobile Nodes to resources in the foreign networks, and (3) secure tunneling of redirected IP datagrams. In this section, we will examine the security needs of Mobile IP and explain our approach to address these needs.
Authentication of Location Updates
Among these Mobile IP messages shown in Figure 2 -1, the registration messages in Basic Mobile IP and the location binding update messages in the Route-Optimized Mobile IP (all displayed in bold italics) carry the location bindings of mobile nodes, i.e. the associations between the permanent address and the current careof-address of Mobile Nodes. By altering the location binding in these control messages or creating bogus messages or replaying pre-recorded messages, an adversary could redirect IP traffic for one node to another node.
In order to frustrate the remote traftic redirection attack mentioned above, registration and binding update messages must be protected with data integrity, origin authentication and anti-replay services.
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Each of these messages hence includes a 64bit identification tag for detecting replays and one or more authentication extensions to provide message integrity and strong authentication using a hashed message authentication code (HMAC) [hmac-md5][hmacshall. Although use of HMAC and an anti-replay tag addresses the security services cited above, the current Mobile IP lacks a scaleable key management scheme for dispatching cryptographic keys needed to support these services. In order to protect the registration messages, keys must be shared at least among Mobile Nodes and their Home Agents. In order to protect the bindlng update messages in the route-optimized Mobile IP, keys must be dispatched among MN-FA, FA-HA and MN-CN pairs.
Access Control of Mobile Nodes
For the purposes of network protection, accounting and resource management, it is desirable that the Foreign Agents (in cooperation with the Home Agents) can verify the identity of an Mobile Node before allowing it to complete its registration and establish an attachment point on the visiting subnets.
The access control procedure should be conducted by (1) verifying the identity of Mobile Node and (2) checking the CUUWI~ status of Mobile Node with a relevant authority, e.g. the Home Agent associated with the Mobile Node. This two-step procedure can ensure both the authenticity and the status of the Mobile Node. In MoIPS, the identity and network affiliation of both end nodes (Mobile Nodes and Corresponding Nodes) and mobility agents (Foreign Agents and Home Agents) are enclosed in the public key certificates issued to these network entities. By exchanging these certificates and performing operations that demonstrate posscsslon of the private keys corresponding to the public keys in the certificates, the end hosts can identify themselves not only to tho mobility agents but also to one another. 
Secure Tunneling of Redirected IP Packets
The traffic to and from an Mobile Node while it is away from its home network generally will traverse the public Internet, as well as the visited foreign networks. The latter may entail the use of via wireless or other insecure communication media. Using these communication paths greatly increases the risks of passive intrusions such as eavesdropping and active attacks such as packet alteration, insertion or deletion. Consequently, both the foreign networks and the home network of the Mobile Node may require data integrity, data origin authentication and possibly confidentiality for the redirected packets.
In order for the home network to have the same level of trust and hence provide the same amount of connectivity to an Mobile Node when it roams among foreign networks as if it is residing at home, the home network will require secure traffic tunneling to and from the Mobile Node (or a trusted agent such as the Foreign Agent connected to the Mobile Node). Similarly, in order for the foreign network to pass trafIic for the Mobile Node, the foreign network will require the traffic to be redirected by an authenticated and trusted entity in Mobile Node's home network such as the Home Agent that manages the Mobile Node. These secure tunnels can be implemented by using IP security protocols (IPSec) in tunneling mode. The protocols will transform each original IP datagram using authentication and encryption mechanisms negotiated by the communicating parties and then encapsulate the datagram in an IPSec header and an external IP header that specifies the end points of the IPSec tunnel. (Such services can be provided by using the Encapsulating Security Payload protocol, one of the two IPsec protocols defined for traffic security.)
The MoIPS architecture provides the requisite protection by incorporating an IPSec implementation and a key management module into the system. The two modules establish IPSec ttmnels according to the instructions received from the Mobile IP module and obtain the public keys needed for establishing these services from a public key infrastructure incorporated into the architecture. IPsec makes use of the Internet Security Association and Key Management Protocol (ISAKMP) [isakmp] for automated key management.
Public-Key Based Architecture
The three security requirements discussed in the previous section demand the following three kinds of security support: lists (CRLs) [pkix-ipki-I] that are issued to Internet nodes (instead of human subjects). We also chose to use the Internet domain name system CONS) [rtc1034] as the primary certificate repository, supplemented occasionally with direct fetches of certificates and pushes of CRLs.
The main consideration motivating the use of PKI technology was scalability: in order to support global intemet mobility, we require a technology that can establish shared secrets in real time among a large population of nodes spread among many network domains all over the world. A DNS-based PKI has clear advantage over a distributed system of key distribution centers (KDCs), such as a multi-realm Kerberos system. Using the DNS not only solves the potentially complicated server discovery problem, but use of certified long-term public keys also eliminates the need for real-time key dispatches by KDCs. Since public key certificates can be issued off-line, a (comparably-sized) certification authority (CA) can issue and manage a much larger number of certificates than the number of clients that can be served by a KDC.
Figure 2-2 illustrates the conceptual structure of MoIPS. Both Mobile IP (basic or route-optimized) and IPSec modules make use of a key management module and a cryptographic engine. The key management module, possibly running different protocols for Mobile IP and IPSec, generates the short-term keys needed by the security services while the crypto-engine, implemented by software libraries or hardware tokens, performs the actual cryptographic (e.g., encryption and authentication) processing. Keys and other security parameters are kept in a protected database and passed only to the crypto-engine. Users of security service such as Mobile Ip or IPSec make use of security parameter indices (spls) to refer to the different security settings. The key management module derives the short-term keys from the long-term public keys it obtains from the X.509 PKI. In order to obtain certified public keys, an X.509 certificate verifier was deveIoped which can fetch certificates and CRL.s via regular DNS lookup and / or receive them through direct exchanges using the certzjkate discovery protocol (CDP) [ipsec-cdp] . It then verifies the public-key signatures on these electronic documents following the trust hierarchy of the certification authorities. The verifier also maintains a cache of received and verified certificates and CRLs, to minimize number of fetches and signature verification operations required.
MoIPS supports multiple hierarchies of certification authorities (CAs), at the top level by cross-certificates. However, the MoIPS prototype does not include the implementation of 0%; instead, it uses the Certificate Management System developed by BBN and sold as a commercial product. The reason for this implementation decision was that future users of MOE'S may prefer to use CAs based on other commercial CA products or make use of commercial CA services.
Where feasible MoIPS makes use of emerging standard cryptographic application programming interfaces (CAPIs) to connect its different modules. For example, it uses the RSA ClyptoKi CAPI as the interface between security service users and the crypto-engine; this interface enables MoIPS to use both the RSAREF crypto-library and the Fortezza crypto-token to perform the cryptographic operations. MoIPS also uses the PF-Key CAPI to support short-term key and security association management. PF-Key is the standard key management interface between IPSec and ISAKMP in the UNIX environment. However, due to the absence of a standard certificate management API, MoIPS developed its own simple interface (shown as Cett-API in Figure   176 2-2) to connect the certificate verifier with the key management module.
x.509 PUBLIC KEY INFRAsTRucTcJRJI (PKI)
In this section, we will examine the core of the Mobile IP security architecture, i.e. a public key infrastructure that manages X.509 v.3 certificates and v.2 certificate revocation lists (CRLs) of the end nodes, and the mobility agents. The certificates and CRLs arc distributed primarily as a new type of resource records X509CCRL in the domain name system. In specific cases [Section 3.81, they are also exchanged using certificate discovery protocol.
Reasons for Developing a DNS-Based PKI
We made a conscious decision in MoIPS to develop a X.509 PKl for Internet nodes and use DNS as the primary certificate dispatch mechanism. Several alternatives for public key management existed when we launched our project; among them, most promising was the secure DNS (DNSSec) activity [dns-secext] in the IETF. In the following, we give the tradeoff of advantages and cost of developing such an infrastructure.
Advantages of using X.509 v.3 Certificales Several important advantages of developing the PKI come from the use of X.509 v.3 certificates instead of bare public keys. The X.509 v-3 certificate profile includes many extension fields for carrying information other than key parameters. In particular, the following fields enable us to add valuable features to the PKI. All in all, X.509 v.3 certificates allows more information to be carried in the certificates and more ways to use this information to support security services. Advantages of using Domain Name System The ubiquitous USC of DNS over the Internet motivated both DNSSec and MoIPS PKI to use it as the certificate dispatch system. The choice is most appropriate for both DNSSec and MoIPS since they manage public keys assigned to network entities instead of human subjects. Moreover, these subjects are identified by domain names and/or IP address -both are information carried by DNS -and the communications among network entities are often established with DNS lookups; hence, DNS certificate fetches can easily be piggybacked onto these regular exchanges. The use of any public key system entails a certain amount of overhead. In comparing X.509 to DNSSec, it is worth noting that X.509 certificates are larger than the KEY and the SIG records stored by DNSSec. However, to store the additional information carried in the X.509 extension fields used in MoIPS, additional DNS record types would have to be created, diminishing the apparent space advantage of DNSSec. In either case, retrieval of certificates (or multiple types of DNSSec records) will usually require TCP instead of UDP communication with DNS servers. The use of CRLs and certificates provides added flexibility for MoIPS, in contrast to the daily update of DNS records that DNSSec substitutes for certificate revocation. Given this difference in approach to revocation management, use of CRLs may result in fewer DNS fetches overall.
Certificate Types
The X.509 PIU used with MoIPS manages h~o types of public key certificates.
Certificates for Mobile IP Control Message Authentication (MoIPS Certiifieates)
These certificates bind the subject names of Mobile Nodes, Corresponding Nodes, Home Agents and Foreign Agents to Diffie-Helman (DH) pubIic keys. The certificates also may carry optional information of host/agent types and their network affiliations. The DH public values are used to produce session keys necessary for authenticating Mobile IP registrations and location updates. The host/agent information may be used to exercise access control. The certificates are issued by the 1 pointer to DNS entry of CRL CAs that enforce Mobile IP securitv uolicv and should not be used by any application other than MobfieIP. -Certz@ates for IP Security Services (ZPSec Certijicates) These are public key certificates issued to support general IP security services, especially data origin authentication and confidentiality. These certificates may carry various public key parameters for different IPSec key management protocols including ISAKMP and SKIP. They are the same as other 1PSec certificates issued to Internet nodes that support IP security services, and are certified by CAs that enforce IP security policy.
Certificate Entitlement and Policies
Policies of MoIPS Certificates All mobile IP aware hosts and mobility agents must have MoIPS certificates in order to authenticate their Mobile IP control messages. However, the certificates for Mobile Nodes and Corresponding Nodes may be issued under different policies than those for Foreign Agents and Home Agents. More specifically, host certificates must indicate the host type. mobile 1 stationary, and may optionally indicate the network domains (e.g. DNS zones) with which the hosts are affiliated. Under no circumstance should a host be marked as both mobile and stationary. On the other hand, agent certificates must indicate the agent type, foreign / home, and may indicate both the network domains the agents are affiliated with and the subnets that the agents are serving (e.g. by giving the subnet prefixes), A mobility agent can be marked as borh a Foreign Agent and a Home Agent if the agent can provide both services. pomter to CRL distribution point in DNS I
Policies of IPSec Certificates
Ail nodes intend to conduct secure Ip communication should possess. valid IPSec certificates. Although it is possible to establish IPSec tunnels using symmetric keys dispatched via Mobile Ip control messages, the practice is not recommended for it bypasses proper setup of security associations. Also, because Mobile IP control message authentication and IP security protection are two orthogonal services, MoIPS Certificates should not be used to setup secure IP communication.
Subject Names
Two candidates of subject names, the IP address and the canonical domain name', beg for a tradeoff in MoIPS PKI. Their preferences differ slightly depending whether the subject is an end node or a certification authority.
For Mobile Nodes, Corresponding Nodes, Foreign Agents and Home Agents, the choice is obvious: the ZP addresses of Internet nodes / interfaces must be the subject name in the certificate because mobile IP protocol uses IP addresses as identifiers of Mobile IP entities. The use of Ip addresses also has two other advantages: (1) it allows MoIPS certificates to be issued to interfaces rather than nodes on the Internet. This allows a multi-4 The shaded rows contain the extension fields of MoIPS CRL,s, and the inverse colored rows mark the fields not used in the CRLs.
5 A canonical domain name is the unique domain name that identifies the DNS entry of the Internet node. In order to support reverse DNS look-up -the conversion from IP addresses to domain names, DNS system requires a unique canonical name for every entry; additional names can be given to an entry as alias names.
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home node to have a certificate issued to each of its network interfaces when it functions as a Foreign Agent or a Home Agent. The configuration is particularly useful when the agent functions as a firewall or serves multiple subnets; (2) it simplifies the verification of NameConstraint: the lowest level CAs may own blocks of IP addresses and issue MoIPS certificates only to the mobility entities with IP addresses falling within the address ranges.
On the other hand, the use of Ip addresses has two disadvantages: (1) the addresses may change over time and (2) they do not refer directly to distinct entries in the DNS. Consequently, the certificates must be revoked and re-issued whenever there is a change of Ip address assigned to a node. Also, multiple certificates may be stored in one DNS entry and a reverse domain name lookup may be needed before searching the DNS directory for the certificates.
For CAs, domain names are the preferred subject names because the use of domain names will eliminate the reverse DNS fookzps before fetching for a CA certificate, though it will introduce a heterogeneous naming scheme to the PKI. Owing to the fact that an Internet node may have multiple domain names, we also enforce the use of canonical domain names in order to specify a unique distribution point for every CA certificate. One can employ multiple SubjAltName fields in a certificate to store both the IP address and domain name of the entity in the same certificate.
MoIPS Certificate and CRL Profiles
MoIPS certificates conform to the profile of standard X.509 v.3 as specified in [pkix-ipki-11. The IssuerUniquelD, SubjUniquelD, PublicKeyUsagePen'od and SubjDirAttributes fields are omitted, as suggested. Table 3 -l contains a summary of fields used in MoIPS all the certificates along tbe path and obtain the public :I specified in [pkix-ipki-I]. Table 3 -2 contains a summary of fields used in MoIPS CRLs.
Certificate Hierarchy
The MoIPS certification hierarchy takes the form of a multipletree structure . Each tree starts with a top-level certification authority (TLCA) at the root, followed by arbitrary layers of middle-level CAs and ends with mobility aware hosts and agents at its leaves.
Each (lower-level) CA owns one or more contiguous blocks of IP addresses, and is responsible for issuing MoIPS certificates to the mobility aware hosts and agents with IP addresses falling within the range. In a fully developed hierarchy, different CAs may be dedicated to issue certificates only to the end nodes (Mobile Nodes and Corresponding Nodes) or the agents (Foreign Agents and Home Agents) under different security policies and manage different CRLs (shown in Figure 3 -1 with dashed arrows).
CAs at adjacent levels are linked by cross certificates and so are the CAs at the roots of the trees. These cross certificates help to form the validation paths of the leave certificate. In order to manage the network of cross certification and control the number of certificates stored in each DNS entry, the structure must limit the number of trees as well as the number of descendants at every level of the hierarchy.
During initialization, every mobility aware entity (host or agent) is loaded with a self-signed certificate6 of its CA via a safe channel supporting peer-entity authentication. When a mobility aware entity wants to obtain the public key of another entity, it shall obtain all the certificates along the verification path between its CA and the target entity. Using the public key contained in the self-signed certificate of its CA, the source entity can then verify 6 A self-signed certificate of a CA is a X.509 certificate signed by the CA using its own private key to binds its subject name with public key parameters and other relevant attributes. The certificate serves well as an end point of a verification path because (1) it does not refer to other signing authority and (2) it provides integrity protection (but not authentication) of the name-key binding.
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target entity.
DNS Based Certificate Dispatch
key of the The X.509 certificate of a CA is stored as a new type of resource record, X509CCRL, in the DNS entry of the CA. Hence, the canonical domain name of the CA, which is also the subject name in its certificate, refers unambiguously to the certificate distribution point.
The X.509 certificates of mobility aware entities (both end hosts and mobility agents) also are stored as X509CCRL type resource records in their DNS entries. Since IP addresses are used as the subject names, a reverse DNS look-up must be used to get the entity's canonical domain name and find the certificate distribution point. If the entity has multiple IP addresses then its DNS entry may contain multiple certificate resource records, each maintains a X.509 certificate assigned to one of its IP addresses. A resolving mechanism must be built so that the module can retrieve the certificate correspond to a specific IP address.
The distribution points of CRL.s can be stored in the DNS entries specifically appointed by the CAs. X.509 v3 certificates allow their CRLs to be stored in fragments at distribution points explicitly specified by the extension field CriDistributionPoint. The DNS entries of network administration centers and/or DNS servers are ideal sites for maintaining the MoIPS CRLs. The multi-site distribution will be an ideal choice for a fully developed DNSbased PKI, however, for simplicity sake, the CRLs are kept in the DNS entries of the issuing CAs in the MoIPS prototype.
There are soft limits on the sizes and offsets of resource records in a DNS entry. To honor those limits, X509CCRL resource records should be stored at the end of a DNS entry without using pointer reference. The resource records may be compressed if the total size of a DNS entry exceeds 64K bytes or individual resource records can be shortened to be less than 500 bytes -the maximum length of an UDP fetch. Otherwise, TCP sessions must be established for fetches of X509CCRL.
Direct Certificate Exchanges
The X.509 certificates and CRLs also can be sent to the requesting entity using the IPSec certificate exchange protocol (CDP) [ipseccdp] , since the communicating parties are able to establish realtime co~ections. However, the DNS system is favored because it provides a global distribution and caching mechanism.
Direct exchange of certificates and CRL.s may be used to cope with particular incidents of certijicure or key revocurion. In order to shorten the wait time between the act of revocation and the publication of the next CRL, MoIPS PKI may mandate an immediate dispatch of a CRL. and the new certificates by concerning Home Agents and Foreign Agents to all the Mobile Nodes with which they maintain active co~ections.
PROTJXXION OF MOBILE IP CONTROL MESSAGES
The data origin authentication and anti-replay protection of Mobile IP control messages are performed infour steps:
1. generation of replay protection identification numbers, 2. generation of short-term keys for data origin authentication, 3. production of message authentication tags based on shortterm keys and message text.
verification of message authentication tags based on short-term keys and message text.
Note that the generation of short-term keys is hidden behind the production and the verification of message authentication tags. These keys should not and need not be revealed to Mobile IP.
Zero-Message Key Generation
As stated in Section 2.2, the authentication service requires a rapid key generation algorithm to supply the necessary short-term keys.
In this section, we describe such an algorithm for deriving shortterm keys from the Diffie-Helman @I-I) secrets shared between pairs of communicating parties. The algorithm requires Mobile IP to supply a transient value, and the replay protection identification number embedded in Mobile IP control messages is chosen to be the transient value.
Design Goals
The key generation algorithm was designed to satisfy the followingfive requirements:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
Usable by all Mobile IP nodes and agents -unlike manual key installation, the algorithm can be used by Mobile Nodes, Corresponding Nodes, Home Agents and Foreign Agents to generate symmetric keys for message authentication without scalability problems.
No modification of Mobile IP message and extension
formats -besides certificate fetches, the algorithm does not require any additional communication between the parties nor any modification to the format of Mobile IP control messages and message extensions.
No use of encryption operations -the algorithm avoids use of encryption operations, to minimize export control complexity.
Strong protection of muster keys -the algorithm aims at Short-Term Keys Once the long-term master key Ku and the making the discovery of the Diffie-Helman long-term transient value T, are prepared, they are fed into the HMAC shared secret, based on the knowledge of keys generated function for generating the short-term key KaU,t, . The default and replay protection numbers, as close as possible to I-WAC function, expressed below, uses MD5 as the base, onerandom guesses.
way hash function:
Low correlation with other DiJfie-Hebnan based key generation -the algorithm was designed to be different from existing Diffie-Helman based key generation algorithms so that there is no significant or consistent correlation between the keys generated by these algorithms.
Computation Algorithm
For two communicating parties that share a*DH secret, the algorithm generates short-term keys by feeding a folded version of the DH secret as the "key" and a finite repetition of the replay protection identification number as the "message" to an HMAC function. The output of the HMAC function is then used to authenticate a Mobile IP control message (which contains the replay protection number) by feeding it and the control message again into a HMAC function.
The algorithm can be divided into three steps: computation of long-term master key, preparation of transient vdues, and production of short-term keys.
Master Keys The algorithm begins by computing the symmetdc secret S, based on the Diftie-Helman private values i, j and public values g' mod p, g' mod p possessed by the two communicating parties:
The long symmetric secret S, is then "folded" by the following operation to produce the long-term master key K~J: :
with The "folding" begins with the breaking down of S, (starting from its lowest order bits) into fragments of length WC equal to that of the short-term keys to be generated. In case the last fragment is shorter than U then a fixed pattern of 55t6 = 01010101s will be padded repeatedly beyond the highest bit. After the fragmentation, a series of exclusive OR operations are performed iteratively to the fragments in ascending order starting with the one with lowest order bits. The long-term master key KU is yielded as the final result of the operations.
Transient Values A 512-bit transient value T, is prepared by eight repeated concatenation of the 64-bit replay protection identification number R, embedded in the Mobile IP control messages:
T, = ;I?,-
The purpose of the repeated concatenation is to increase the length as well as the number of changing bits in the transient value to be fed into the HMAC function. This step is particularly important if R, is derived from a timestamp with many slow changing bits, Nevertheless, the concatenation does not increase the total number of transient values and hence the total number of short-term keys which can be generated. If the replay protection numbers are 64 bits in length then a total of 264 different keys can be generated for each pair of communicating parties that share a DH symmetric secret.
. 
IPSECPROTE~TION OF PACKET REDIRECTION
Another function of the MoIPS architecture is to offer IPSec protection to IP datagrams redirected by Mobile IP. When implemented on selected packet tunnels, the IPSec data origin authentication and data confidentiality services enable the Mobile Nodes to enjoy the same network connectivity (with possible performance degradation) and communication privacy as when they were attached to their home networks. These services also augment the firewall traversal guidelines proposed by Gupta and Glass [mip-firewall-trav] to pass redirected datagrams through the firewalls defending both Mobile Node's home and visiting foreign networks.
Selective Use of MIP-IPSec Tunnels
Due to the different options existing in Mobile IP -particularly, the use of reverse tunneling and the choice between co-located or foreign-agent care-of addresses -IP tunnels can be established in different combinations of Mobile Nodes, Foreign Agents and Home Agents using full or minimal IP-IP encapsulations; any of these tunnels can be protected by IPSec protocol. Table 5 -1 lists the possible tunnels7 with C and -C marking the use of co-located or Foreign Agent bounded Care-of Address, R and -R marking the use/not use of reverse tunneling.
Notice that tunnels between the Corresponding Nodes and the mobility agents are not included among the choices. This is mainly due to the lack of mechanism in current Mobile IP for setting up 7 Table 5 -I notations: 4 marks the packet redirecting tunnels, + marks the end-to-end tunnels between communicating hosts, E marks the tunnel which only exists when MN-FA encapsulation is used in reverse tunneling, and the dark shade marks an unintended use of the reverse tunneling flag to select an MN-HA tunnel with co-located COA although reverse tunneling is used primarily with FA bounded COA.
Agents and Home Agents is hidden from the Corresponding Nodes, and no provision was made for these entities to communicate via Mobile IP control messages. Hence, although the Corresponding Nodes may learn the presence of Foreign Agents in route-optimized Mobile IP when they receive the Foreign Agent Care-of Address of Mobile Nodes, they must establish the IPSec tunnels by themselves without any assistance from Mobile IP. Moreover, the use of CN-FA tunnels may be less cost effective because they must be re-established frequently as Mobile Nodes roam in the foreign networks.
Among the possible IPSec tunnels, the MN-CN pair are end-toend tunnels that may exist regardless of Mobile IP. We recommend using them whenever end-to-end security is needed. The remaining three pairs of tunnels, HA-FA, MN-HA and MN-FA, are introduced by Mobile IP packet redirection. Among them, the MN-HA tunnels are most useful while the MN-FA ones are the least. Their uses will be studied individually in the following paragraphs.
FA-HA TunneZs The MIP-IPSec tunnel going from a Home Agent to a Foreign Agent (and from a Foreign Agent to a Home Agent if reverse tunnel and Foreign Agent Care-of Address are used) are the easiest to establish. They can be implemented by simply adding IPSec protection to the existing Mobile IP tunnels.
When they are used to support data-origin authentication and confidentiality, these tunnels provide a virtual private network (VPN) connection between the home network and the foreign network currently visited by the Mobile Node. Such a connection may allow the Mobile Node to obtain the same connectivity as it is at home only if the Foreign Agent can strongly authenticate Mobile Node in either network or link layer. The more notable value of using the FA-HA tunnels arises perhaps from its use in firewall traversal. By configuring the firewalls in the foreign networks as Foreign Agents and setting up the FA-HA tunnels, we Table 5 MN-HA Tunnels The MN-HA JPSec tunnels supporting dataorigin authentication and confidentiality will be the most useful tunnels as they provide a secure communication path between a Mobile Node and its home network. The data-m&in authentication (and integrity) wiI1 prevent spoofing, while data confidentiality will frustrate eavesdropping. By using the tunnels in both directions, an Mobile Node can have secure communication with its home network and enjoy the same co~ectivity as it has at home. Nonetheless, the tunnels do not provide all the protection required by the home network; in order to safeguard the home network, the Mobile Node must function as a firewall on the home network performing perimeter protection tasks specified by the network security policy.
The MN-HA tunnels are, however, more expensive to establish: since they are not a part of the packet redirection mechanism, they must be built separately using the procedure described in Section 5.2. MN-FA Tunnels The MN-FA lPSec tUMdS can be used in two ways if no link-layer protection has already provided the services: (1) data confidentiality for Mobile Node over the foreign network and (2) data origin authentication of MN-FA exchange. However, the MN-FA tunnels exist only if Mobile Node chooses to use an Foreign Agent Care-of Address and must be built by re-encapsulating the IP datagrams. Hence, these tunnels are expensive and should be replaced by MN-CN or MN-HA tunnels whenever possible. Tunnel Use in Firewall Traversal The MIP-IPSec tunnels studied in this section do not offer a complete solution to the firewall traversal problem encountered by packets redirected by Mobile lP; particularly, they cannot hide the unknown source or destination addresses caused by the use of private network addresses. Nevertheless, they can augment Gupta and Glass' guidelines in the following two ways:
1. With IPSec protection on Mobile IP redirected packets, firewalls which can parse Mobile IP and IPSec protocols may admit the protected packets with reduced risks.
2. By implementing the functions of both a firewall and a mobility agent, a network entity can provide thorough protection to its network by becoming an authenticated endpoint of the redirected packets and the processor of these packets based on Mobile lP information it has.
In order to provide the second type of protection, a hierarchy of Foreign Agents must be built to implement multi-layers of firewalls surrounding a foreign network. AIso, the Mobile Nodes must be assigned permanent lP addresses belonging to the perimeter networks enclosed by the firewalls. Both arrangements are technically feasible and may be regarded as the price for
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The establishment of MlP-IPScc tunnels takes two steps: (1) the mutual agreement among MobiIe Nodes, Foreign Agents and Home Agents on the selection of tunnels and (2) the negotiation of necessary security associations using ISAKMP. After these steps, the involved entities may start to send IP-IP encapsulated datagrams protected by IPSec.
In this section, we will go through the tunnel selection process and comment briefly on the ISAKMP negotiation as well as the integration of lPSec with minimal lP-IP encapsulation.
Selection of IPSec Tunnels
The selection process aims at achieving an agreement among Mobile Nodes, Foreign Agents and Home Agents on the choices of tunnels which are protected with IPSec.
To reduce communication overhead, all exchanges will be conducted as extensions of Mobile IP control messages. As an example, Figure 5 
Cvptographic Engine
The MoIPS prototype uses RSAREF as the default cryptographic library, but chooses to interface with the library via the RSA PKCS#ll CryptoKi CAPI. This design decision allows the prototype to be compatible with other cryptographic processing support such as the Fortezza hardware tokens. The CryptoKi is a low-level session-oriented CAPI, which was thoroughly documented in [PKCSli] and [zP96] . However, in order to hide a few low-level function calls from its clients, the MoIPS prototype implemented a small number of "wrapper' functions [moips-tech-rprt-61. Currently, Mobile IP, CV and ZmKeyGen modules all use the CryptoKi CAPI. IPSec and ISAKMP modules, on the other hand, uses built-in cryptographic functions. Cert@ate Fetcher and Forei& Agent Proxy The DNS Certificate Fetcher connects CV to the DNS daemon either directly or indirectly via the Foreign-Agent Proxy. In both cases, the two modules work together to provide the CV with X509CCRL resource records extracted from DNS entries.
Certificate Discoveu Protocol Executive
The CV module can use either DNS or CDP to fetch certificates and C!RLs. In MoIPS, CDP was used to receive CRLs as they are pushed to the nodes in urgent cases.
CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we describe the design and the first implementation of a public key management structure which satisfies the security requirements of Mobile IP for authenticated mobile node location updates and IPSec protected packet redirection. The system may have many promising applications including scaleable implementations of secure route-optimized Mobile IP and IPSec supported virtual private networking of Mobile IP traffic. The project shall be supplemented with future work on fast and hierarchical location management and efficient management of security associations based on security policies of network domains.
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